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WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE

MILITARY SEEKING THE RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR WAR?
If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.
?George Washington
The United States Constitution empowers Congress with the legislative authority to declare war, maintain a military, and control the federal taxing and policies that will be used to shape the nation's defense.
1 Accordingly, Congress must consider funding the resources that the warfighters believes are necessary to conduct the military mission. 
Strategy Research Project addresses this issue and identifies "what can be done to improve the relationship between Congress and the military in providing the resources required for war."
WHY DOES CONGRESS CONSTRAIN ITS FUNDING OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS?
Control of the purse strings is one of the most critical tools Congress uses to effectively conduct its oversight responsibilities in military affairs. Accordingly, the military's relationship with Congress must often focus on convincing the legislators to provide financial support for the resources that the Services believe are necessary for military readiness in order to successfully accomplish their mission. Conversely, "the formal institutions and process through which Congress carries out its constitutional responsibilities for the defense budget have become complex over time" with Congressional committees being key to the process. 5 Moreover, since the 1986 passage of the Department of Defense (DoD) Authorization Act, the Defense Department has been required to submit biennial budgets to assist Congress with its budgetary planning requirements. 6 Congress enacted the DoD Authorization Act because its members believed that defense programs and activities would be more effective and efficient if they were funded on a two-year cycle rather than annually. 7 The biennial budget concept, however, has not been well received by all Congressional committees. 8 Consequently, rather than being the help it was intended to be, the DoD Authorization Act has further complicated the process. The
House and Senate authorization committees, for instance, "have been authorizing some of the programs for two years; while the appropriations committees have been appropriating funds yearly." 9 Therefore, despite the move towards a biennial budget, every year the Services and the Defense Department leadership are still confronted with the necessity of defending their budgetary requirements for weapon systems and other military resources.
No one questions that "members of Congress are committed to the goal of ensuring national security and the status of the United States as the preeminent military power." 10 The problem is that the nation's money is finite, and so some military projects cannot be funded when the warfighter needs them. This hard reality confronts Congress each year, because it has the responsibility for understanding both current and future warfighting requirements and then deciding how to allocate and balance the increasingly scarce resources against the nation's other competing needs.
11 Moreover, members of Congress are obligated to respond to the pressures of their constituents (see Figure 1 ) when allocating resources for any reason.
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Members have a "responsibility to reflect the viewpoint of a majority of their constituents in their work in Washington, and if they fail to read the pulse of public opinion in their District or State accurately, a majority of the voters in that area will find someone else in the next election who does." 13 Congressional representatives are "elected after repeatedly advocating and explaining the basis for their opinions during their campaign for office." 14 As such, the mindset and priorities of Congressional members may differ from the military leadership.
ESCALATING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS EXACERBATE CONGRESS'S FUNDING CONSTRAINTS
Historically, the problems with military funding constraints have been exacerbated when the acquisition a of weapon system takes longer than planned or costs more than Congress was led to believe it would. This is especially true when the original cost figure was used as the basis for other Congressional budgetary decisions. For example, consider the military plans to acquire the F-22 fighter aircraft. The lack of consensus about future threats and defense requirements has led to increasing Congressional skepticism about the need for the F-22. As a result of (1) Iraq's persistent non-compliance with these resolutions, and (2) The attack on the United States and the war that has been visited upon us highlights a fundamental condition of our circumstances: we cannot and will not know precisely where and when America's interests will be threatened, when America will come under attack, or when Americans might die as the result of aggression. We can be clear about trends, but uncertain about events. We can identify threats, but cannot know when or where America or its friends will be attacked. We should try mightily to avoid surprise, but we must also learn to expect it. We must constantly strive to get better intelligence, but we must also remember that there will always be gaps in our intelligence. Adapting to surprise -adapting quickly and decisively -must therefore be a condition of planning.
A central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defense planning from a "threat-based" model that has dominated thinking in the past to a "capabilitiesbased" model for the future. This capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes that it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives 47 The declaration above, which was identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review is critical because its establishes the foundation for the shift in warfare planning and the need to have both conventional and non-conventional weapon systems. As al-Qaeda demonstrated, combat is no longer limited to nation against nation in some well-defined theatre of war. Instead of national armed forces, the United States military may have to have battle ideological groups who can execute attacks against the United States and its allies using common household or commercially available items to inflict the same devastation as a 2000-pound bomb. The delivery mechanisms can be as simple as a box cutter or a Ryder Rent-A-Truck or a missile cleverly disguised as a commercial aircraft. Employing conventional forces of bombers, heavy land masses, etc against non-conventional threats such as non-States and terrorist is not the optimal solution, in fact, in some cases it will not be an alternative at all.
To win future wars, the United States military must transform its tactics and weapon systems to operate within this new reality. 48 Congress must also consider these new requirements for the Armed Forces and, where appropriate, provide the requisite funding. In fact, to address this emerging requirement Congress has already increased appropriations to the Defense Department. 49 Deterring and defeating these new types of threats are vital to the security of the homeland. 50 Nonetheless, the military requirements to meet these challenges must be tempered with economic realities.
WILL TRANSFORMATION FURTHER COMPLICATE CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY RELATIONS?
The need for the military to transform itself in response to the new threat environment does not necessarily mean a greater need for additional funding for weapon systems.
Notwithstanding, the political, technological and economic realities in which we find ourselves dictate that fundamental changes be made to the military mindset. Roles and missions within the Armed Forces overlap and hence produce inefficiency. Consequently, these mission overlaps coupled with limited resources restricts the ability of the military leadership to think outside the box because they must protect their respective branch. Accordingly, the military leadership is not necessarily motivated to identify ways to reduce funding requirements especially if their respective Service may suffer adverse effects.
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Failure of the Services to make concerted efforts to address this issue will likely cause Congress to further scrutinize budgets for military resources, especially when funding requests include transformation requirements.
HOW ARE REQUESTS FOR MILITARY RESOURCES TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS?
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is a critical tool used by the Defense Department and military to assist Congress with making the budgetary decisions for the acquisition of weapon systems. 63 The PPBS is an essential element of the defense resource allocation process. During the PPBS process the "Secretary of Defense make choices for providing operational commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment within fiscal constraints." 64 When the PPBS process is concluded, the Secretary's choices are translated into budgetary requirements. 65 Although there are typically three phases of the PPBS, it should be noted that the current Bush Administration has opted to combine the budget and programming phase. 66 However, for the purposes of this paper each phase will be discussed.
Planning is the first phase in the PPBS and is accomplished about three years in advance of the fiscal year in which budget authority will be requested. • Formulating, coordinating and supervising policies and programs that impact upon the Army's relations with Congress.
• Providing liaison between the Army and committees of Congress (excepting Appropriations, Civil Works and Printing).
• Advising on the status of congressional affairs that affect the Army and on legislative aspects of Army policies, plans and programs.
• Providing prompt, coordinated, consistent and factual information to inquiries received from members, or for congressional reports on legislative and Policy and Liaison for the California National Guard stated "Our strategy is constructed based on the concept that the members of Congress change and consequently so do the priorities of its leadership." 96 His organization has carefully refined and fine-tuned a long-standing plan, which they proudly claim is the key to their success with Congress. 97 Their strategy commences each year with the development of a legislative agenda that is approved and published by their state Adjutant General. Their legislative agenda describes specific funding and/or policy changes required from Congress.
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Upon approval of their legislative agenda, they ensure their readiness by learning everything they can about the members of the Congressional committee responsible for appropriations and policy. 99 This includes (1) researching any non-defense issues that are important to Congress and its constituents, (2) examining their historical voting record and (3) understanding the member's special interests. 100 Moreover, with a passion they develop and foster standing relationships with the staffers. 
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The Legislative Liaison Offices can be quite effective. However; the legislative liaison responsibilities do not necessarily include creating appropriation and budgeting policy. 108 They are predominately a conduit for interactions (i.e., inquiries, investigations, depositions, etc) between Congress and the individual Services. Furthermore, as evident by their functions, the legislative liaison offices are not intended to be a comprehensive forum for developing common Service wide measures to resolve the issues stated herein.
WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE MILITARY IN PROVIDING THE RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR WAR?
THERE ARE THREE OVERARCHING PROBLEMS THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO  IMPROVE THE The second problem is Congress has no standing representation in the National Security Chiefs of Staff (see Figure 3) . However, the Generals would be embedded advisors in both committees. Directing the military to serve as advisors to Congress requires very strict adherence to civilian control of the military in order to avoid compromising the political process. One way to address this issue is by formally establishing and enacting civil-military norms. This topic was discussed with General Lester L. Lyles, Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, who consented to an interview for this research. During the interview General Lyles affirmed that the military leadership takes its responsibility in the national policy-making process seriously. The military profession's first obligation is to do no harm to the state's democratic institution and the democratic policy-making process that they establish. The military leadership should apply its expertise without "shirking" or taking actions that, in effect, have a determinative effect on policy outcomes. Military professions must develop a clear sense of distinction between national security competency and the responsibility to exercise competency through distinct roles in the national policy-making process.
125
However, the main objective of Dr. Ulrich's proposed civil-military norm is to predominately provide guidance on how the Officers Corp should conform to better work with its civilian leadership. 126 Therefore, while her norms provide a good starting point, for the purposes of this research they require tailoring to (a) better address the issues raised in this paper and (b) create a single set of civil-military norms that include both how the military should interact with the civilian leadership and how civilians should interact with the military leaders in national policy-making organizations. Therefore, recommend the following changes be made to Ulrich's proposed civil-military norm and that it be legislated by Congress:
Military professionals must always keep in the forefront of their planning that civilian control over the military is the supreme tenet of the nation's democratic values.
Accordingly, the military profession's first obligation is to not harm either the nation's democratic institutions nor its national policy making processes. The military leadership participating in political forums are obliged to fully understand and respect the national policy making process. The military leadership is expected to insert their expertise without compromising and/or interfering with Congressional members' or any other political leaders' responsibilities to the nation. Moreover, the military leadership must not take actions that, in effect, determine or force a specific national security policy position.
Conversely, the political leadership must not shirk their (1) 
